Runs make the bank : The fragile capital structure of banks make them inevitably prone to runs, and that's a good thing by Vanessa Sumo
B
anks are one of the most powerful and enduring 
institutions of all time. They have survived runs and
panics and the Great Depression. They have folded,
divided, and merged. They have withstood and participated
in the parade of financial innovation. And even flourishing
capital markets could not make them obsolete.
The persistence and pervasiveness of banks suggests that
they provide a unique service. Companies, for example,
overwhelmingly prefer banks when seeking financing out-
side their own coffers. “Bank loans are the predominant
source of external funding in all the [industrialized] coun-
tries,” note economists Gary Gorton of the University of
Pennsylvania and Andrew Winton of the University of
Minnesota, authors of a survey on financial intermediation.
Instead of borrowing from banks, firms could secure the
funding they need through the sale of a stock or bond, by
going directly to the capital market. However, “in none of
the countries are capital markets a significant source of
financing,” Gorton and Winton note. “Equity markets are
insignificant.” Their observations come from a 1990 study
that looks at the sources of net financing by nonfinancial
enterprises from 1970 to 1985. In the United States, about
24.4 percent of investment by firms was financed by bank
loans, 11.6 percent by bonds, and only 1.1 percent by shares.
Studies have also found that the stock market price of a
firm responds more favorably to the announcement of a new
bank loan or the renewal of an existing one, compared with
news of an offering of company securities in capital markets.
Others have shown that if a borrower’s bank fails, it can
cause a substantial loss to the borrower because his valuable
relationship with a bank is destroyed. In other words, it
won’t be easy for a borrower to switch financiers if his bank
shuts down.
But what specifically makes banks so special? What is it
about the way they organize themselves that sets them apart
from other businesses? The fact is, as dominant as banks are,
their basic structure is actually quite fragile. On the asset
side, banks make loans to borrowers that are typically long-
term and are inherently illiquid, not easily converted to cash.
On the liability side, depositors expect that they can with-
draw their money anytime they need to. However, this may
force banks to sell their assets, possibly at a much lower
price, if depositors demand more money than what the bank
has readily available. Thus, the bank’s activities on both
sides of the balance sheet, although valuable, appear to be
ruinously incompatible.
To protect banks and their clients from this apparent vul-
nerability, financial regulators have typically responded with
supervision, safety nets, and even proposals to downsize and
restrict banks’ activities. However, University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business economists Douglas Diamond,
who is also a visiting scholar at the Richmond Fed, and
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 Raghuram Rajan say that there is actu-
ally a good reason for a bank’s choice
of such a delicate arrangement. 
Far from being a concern, a bank’s
distinctive asset and liability structure
is precisely what allows the bank to
provide liquidity at all times; that is, to
make funds available to both long-
term borrowers and short-term
depositors whenever a need arises.
The explanation for this surprising
result comes from a rather catastrophic
prospect built into a bank’s fragile 
capital structure: the threat of runs. 
Bank Runs
When the public suspects that a bank
may become insolvent, depositors will
rush to take out their money in des-
perate hope that they won’t be last in
line. The sudden demand for cash can
force a bank to sell assets prematurely
at a loss and, consequently, may cause
that bank to fail, whether or not it was
healthy prior to the run. On a scale
that affects many banks, runs can dis-
rupt economic activity and cause
financial distress to many people. 
Perhaps paradoxically, the possibil-
ity of bank runs arises from a valuable
service that banks perform: trans-
forming illiquid assets or bank loans
into liquid liabilities or deposits,
according to a 1983 paper by Diamond
and Washington University economist
Philip Dybvig, considered the most
important and well-known analysis on
bank runs. In other words, the ability
to provide funds to depositors on
demand even if the bank holds mostly
illiquid assets on its balance sheet is
what makes a bank a bank. But it is
also why they are vulnerable to runs.
A depositor may want to invest his
money but is worried that tying up his
funds will make it difficult to with-
draw, except at a considerable loss,
when a personal need suddenly arises.
Banks — as opposed to another invest-
ment vehicle — can improve upon this
situation by getting all the depositors
together and pooling everybody’s risk
of holding an illiquid asset. This works
well because banks know with some
certainty that for a given pool of
depositors, only a fraction will ordi-
narily take out their money at any
given time. Thus, banks can offer
depositors a way to get out on better
terms than would have been available
to them had they invested individually.
But this solution also opens up the
possibility that things may not go
according to plan. If depositors panic
and turn up earlier than expected, then
those who will come to the bank later
know that they may not get 
as much as they were promised, and
indeed may not get anything at 
all because the bank will not have 
sufficient resources. Thus, a “first-
come-first-served” rule induces the
very real possibility that if some depos-
itors ever get a whiff that a bank may
be in trouble, even those who were pre-
viously not concerned about the bank’s
health will rush to withdraw their
money. “If a run is feared, it becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy,” says Diamond.
Whether the rumor was true or not
and whether depositors believe it or
not, no depositor wants to be the last
one to line up at the bank’s door. This
summer, depositors at British bank
Northern Rock raced to take out their
money when news leaked out that the
central bank would provide emergency
funds to the troubled bank. 
Deposit insurance is one way to
prevent runs and is provided in many
countries. The purpose and terms may
differ, but deposit insurance in general
assures that no matter what happens
to the bank and no matter how many
people come to withdraw, depositors
will always get the amount that they
were promised. The government is a
natural insurance provider because it
has the authority to tax, say Diamond
and Dybvig, so it can guarantee to
come to the bank’s rescue without
having to hold a large amount of liquid
assets to back up that claim. Adeposit
insurance law commits the govern-
ment to insure banks, which is a
stronger pledge than more discre-
tionary policies such as suspending the
convertibility of deposits to cash.
Runs as a Commitment Device
One would think that a bank’s fragile
structure is surely a weakness, for how
can bank runs be a good thing? But
according to Diamond and Rajan, this
weakness is also its strength. In a series
of papers written in 2000 and 2001,
Diamond and Rajan argue that banks
as we know them today choose such a
structure because the possibility of a
run is what gives them the power to
provide liquidity, which is the very
thing that makes banks unique.
The story begins in a theoretical
environment where banks don’t exist.
An entrepreneur needs to finance a
project and a lender has money to
invest in it. Only the entrepreneur has
the specific skill to generate the high-
est cash flow possible from this
undertaking, so once the investment is
made, the project would be worth
much less in somebody else’s hands. In
this case, a lender’s investment in that
project is said to be illiquid. One could
think of a top-rated chef who wants to
open a restaurant. If he decides to quit
before the restaurant opens, then the
lender can seize the restaurant, but he
would have difficulty finding another
chef of the same caliber to operate it. 
The plot gets thicker if the lender
himself needs cash at some interim
date. To obtain the money, the lender
can opt to borrow against the loan he
made to the chef, by promising to col-
lect the cash flows generated from the
restaurant venture on behalf of a new
investor. However, the investor knows
only too well that the lender might be
tempted to pay back less than what
they agreed upon. If the investor
thinks that the lender cannot commit
to being honest, then it would be
impossible for the lender to borrow an
amount equivalent to the full value of
the loan. The consequence of this
chain of illiquidity is clear: Either the
loan to the chef will not be made in the
first place or the cost to him of bor-
rowing money will be very high,
because the lender will need to be
compensated for the illiquidity of 
the loan.
The way to resolve this dilemma is
for the lender to write a contract that
guarantees investors can take out their
money at any time they please. In this
way, if the lender tries to extract more
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and offering investors less than what
had been promised, then investors will
quickly withdraw all their funds
because they assume others will 
do the same, leaving the lender empty-
handed. Arun is painful for the lender
because his income depends primarily
on the service he provides as an inter-
mediary between the entrepreneur
and the investors, so a run will drive
his income to zero. Therefore, the
lender would never attempt to 
renegotiate the contract and will
always strive to give investors what 
he promised.
As it turns out, this type of “rela-
tionship” lender is exactly the kind of
bank we have today, one that lends
money for long-term projects but at
the same time collects short-term
deposits. A delicate capital structure
that is vulnerable to runs is what
makes the bank’s commitment credi-
ble and effective. This ensures that
depositors will always be willing to put
their money in the bank, and that
there will always be a steady supply of
funds for the bank to lend to entrepre-
neurs. If the bank ever misbehaves,
then the depositors will run and the
bank will shut down.
Thus, if depositors couldn’t run on
the bank, then there would be no 
way to create liquidity. While it may
seem counterintuitive to think of a
bank run as a good thing, it is actually
only the possibility of one that is 
desirable. “The threat of a run, great;
the fact of a run, that’s bad,” says
Diamond. 
The commitment to discipline
banks is convincing because it promises
to punish even if the punishment is
painful for the depositors themselves.
“This is going to hurt me as much as it
is going to hurt you, but I will do it
anyway. Therefore, you know that if
you mess around, you’re going to get
the sanction imposed on you,”
explains Diamond by taking the
depositor’s perspective. Even if it is
not in the depositors’ collective inter-
est to pull their money out, they will
rush to the bank anyway when they
spot a crime in progress.  
The Narrow Banking Alternative
Stuart Greenbaum, former dean 
and professor emeritus of finance at
Washington University, thinks that
while Diamond and Rajan’s proposal
has some merit, “building in a weak-
ness because the weakness will make
you strong” sounds a bit like “hotel
music.” It’s pleasing, but it makes too
much of a bank’s delicate capital struc-
ture. “It’s one of those arguments
where you find virtue in a weakness,
developing compensating strengths
for some sort of disability you might
have,” says Greenbaum. 
It could be desirable to avoid a frag-
ile structure altogether, according to
economists who believe that a 100
percent reserve requirement should be
imposed on deposits that can be with-
drawn on demand (this group includes
Milton Friedman). Such a proposal
would effectively narrow a bank’s
activities by requiring it to invest
demand deposits solely in “safe” short-
term assets like Treasury bills, as
opposed to illiquid assets such as
loans. Putting deposits in very liquid
assets makes the banking system run-
proof. It precludes a bank run because
depositors know with certainty that
their deposits are backed by invest-
ments the bank can quickly convert
into cash. A narrow bank could be
chartered separately, while other insti-
tutions that lend to longer-term
projects would be forbidden to finance
these projects with demand deposits. 
Narrow banking would make the
financial system a more stable place
because it would provide greater safety
against bank runs, says Greenbaum.
But it would come with a cost. Under a
narrow banking arrangement, deposit-
taking banks would lose that special
ability to turn illiquid assets into liquid
liabilities. “It provides a greater degree
of safety, at a cost of the production of
liquidity through mismatching [of
assets and liabilities],” Greenbaum
says. In other words, banks would not
be able to use the rich mass of demand
deposits to fund projects that have a
much longer duration. Economists
agree on this, but disagree on just how
large that cost is.
An analysis by Neil Wallace, 
an economist at Pennsylvania State
University, attempts to quantitatively
compare these opposing worlds, by
extending the original Diamond and
Dybvig model of fragile banking to
include the possibility of a narrow
banking system. Overall, he finds that
the narrow banking alternative is
undesirable. “It eliminated any role for
banking,” says Wallace. History is rife
with episodes of panics and runs, and
perhaps narrow banking can prevent
that, but at what cost? Wallace thinks
it might be substantial. “Using narrow
banking to cope with the potential
problems of banking illiquidity is anal-
ogous to reducing automobile
accidents by limiting automobile
speeds to zero,” writes Wallace in his
paper. Diamond and Rajan agree. 
They think that narrow banking 
would essentially “kill liquidity 
creation and result in lower credit
availability to borrowers.” 
Greenbaum, however, thinks other-
wise. “It doesn’t preclude the produc-
tion of liquidity,” Greenbaum says. 
He says that there are other ways of
creating liquidity without using
demand deposits, in particular by “mis-
matching” other financial instruments
on the bank’s balance sheet. For
instance, instead of using the money
from checking accounts and trans-
forming these funds into loans, another
institution can take a one-year time
deposit and lend out a three-year loan.
Hence, in this view, banks do not need
the threat of runs to create liquidity.
(However, some ways of creating liq-
uidity may not be immune from
run-like events. Recently, “structured
investment vehicles,” which issue com-
mercial paper backed by longer-term
assets such as mortgages, had trouble
rolling over their paper when investors
started doubting the quality of the
underlying assets.)
Nonetheless, no country has ever
experimented with narrow banking
and Greenbaum says it will probably
never happen. And so in the existing
banking system where banks’ long-
term assets are backed by mostly
demand deposits, regulators have
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safety nets. “We make the best of it.
We do it with regulation, we do it with
monitoring, and all sorts of restric-
tions in order to avoid the worst
instability. That’s the basic fact of 
the case,” says Greenbaum.
The Implication for Safety Nets
The threat of runs, say Diamond and
Rajan, keeps banks from misbehaving,
because if they ever do anything that
people perceive might impose a loss
on depositors, the bank would be
closed immediately. If so, then certain
safety nets like deposit insurance,
which is often thought to prevent
jumpy depositors from running on 
the bank, may actually reduce the
incentive for banks to behave well
because it removes the depositors
commitment to run. So why have
deposit insurance?  
In the real world, unexpected
events can cause losses, even if they
have nothing to do with a bank’s
behavior. For instance, if the economy
is hit by a recession, a bank’s invest-
ments may not generate as much
return as expected, and as a result, the
bank may not be able to deliver what it
promised to its depositors. Thus,
while the threat of runs keeps banks
from misbehaving, the real-world
uncertainty might make it excessively
susceptible to panics.  
In this case, deposit insurance
could be helpful by tempering deposi-
tors’ nerves, but where to draw the line
is tricky. On the one hand, bank panics
and their dire consequences should be
avoided, but on the other, a fully
insured bank will lose the disciplining
mechanism that was built in its capital
structure — it would make banks more
likely to take big risks. As a result,
deposit insurance would require addi-
tional financial regulation because the
onus to impose the appropriate penal-
ties now lies with the regulator.
“Deposit insurance is only going to
work well if regulators are good at actu-
ally closing banks whenever they
misbehave,” Diamond says.
But if there is a sense that some
banks may be too big to fail, regulators
may be hesitant to carry out that pun-
ishment. Diamond thinks that having
limited deposit insurance likewise 
disciplines the regulators themselves,
because if they intervene to bail out 
a bank, then this very public event 
will receive scrutiny by the political
process, which can subsequently
improve regulation. Hence, in assess-
ing how much of a bank’s deposits
should be insured, regulators must try
to get as much as possible of the good
and very little of the bad. They would
have to weigh the importance of
enforcing discipline against ensuring
financial stability.
The implications of Diamond and
Rajan’s proposal for deposit insurance
also hold true for capital adequacy
rules. Bank capital includes long-term
claims such as equity and long-term
debt, “softer” claims that are not sub-
ject to runs. As such, too high an
amount of bank capital is not desirable
because it impairs the bank’s ability to
create liquidity by removing the
depositors’ incentive to punish. But if
banks keep too low a buffer, then they
might fail too often. Indeed, banks
themselves will choose some amount
of capital, regardless of government
regulation. 
The question, then, is whether 
regulators want to stipulate an amount
other than that level, keeping in mind
the trade-off between creating 
liquidity and stability in the financial
system. If stability is considered the
more important goal and a higher 
minimum capital requirement is stipu-
lated, then regulatory standards ought
to be more intense to keep the banks
in check. If these standards are good,
then a higher level of capital require-
ment won’t compromise too much of
the bank’s unique ability to provide
funds to those who need it and at 
the same time will make the bank less 
vulnerable to the vagaries of the 
business cycle. 
Despite their apparent fragility,
banks have persevered through 
centuries and continue to be integral
to the economy. Indeed, one can 
recognize the might of banks by the
grandeur of their buildings and marble
interiors, just as the palaces of the 
past were iconic of the stature of kings
and queens. And just as the power 
of the monarchies relies on the 
allegiance of their subjects, the
strength of banks depends mostly, 
as it turns out, on even the littlest of
their depositors. RF
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